We propose two parallelisable variants of Camellia and SMS4 block ciphers based on the n-cell GF-NLFSR. The n-cell generalised Feistel-non-linear feedback shift register (GF-NLFSR) structure (Choy et al., 2009a ) is a generalised unbalanced Feistel network that can be considered as a generalisation of the outer function FO of the KASUMI block cipher. An advantage of this cipher over other n-cell generalised Feistel networks, e.g., SMS4 (Diffe and Ledin, 2008) and Camellia (Aokiet al., 2001), is that it is parallelisable for up to n rounds. In hardware implementations, the benefits translate to speeding up encryption by up to n times while consuming similar area and significantly less power. At the same time, n-cell GF-NLFSR structures offer similar proofs of security against differential cryptanalysis as conventional n-cell Feistel structures. In this paper, we prove security against differential, linear and boomerang attacks. We also show that the selected number of rounds are conservative enough to provide high security margin against other known attacks such as integral, impossible differential, higher order differential, interpolation, slide, XSL and related-key differential attacks.
Introduction

Background and motivation
Two very important security properties of block cipher structures are low differential and linear probability bounds for protection against differential and linear cryptanalysis. Choy et al. (2009a) had proven that the 'true' differential/linear probabilities of any n rounds of the n-cell GF-NLFSR structure is p 2 if the differential/linear probability of the non-linear function of each round is p. However, this result is applicable only if we use a non-linear function with good provable differential/linear probability. One option is to use an S-box. However, if the non-linear function takes in 32-bit input, an S-box of this size would be infeasible to implement in terms of logic gates in hardware or as a look-up-table in memory. Other options would be to build a substitution-diffusionsubstitution (SDS) structure (Park et al., 2003) , use a Feistel structure (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/ skipjack/skipjack.pdf) or even a nested Feistel structure for the non-linear function (http://www.etsi.org/website/ document/algorithms/ts_135202v070000p.pdf) because there are provable bounds for the differential and linear probabilities of these structures.
However, these non-linear functions are too complex, and cannot be implemented efficiently with respect to either space or speed. Therefore, the substitution-then-diffusion structure is usually implemented for the non-linear functions. These structures are commonly called substitution permutation networks (SPN) in the literature. Numerous examples of implementations where the SPN structure is used for the non-linear functions of Feistel and generalised Feistel structures exist. They include DES (National Bureau of Standards, 1977) , Camellia (Aoki et al., 2001) , SMS4 (Diffe and Ledin, 2008) and Clefia (Shirai et al., 2007) , to name a few. Motivated by these considerations, we would like to investigate the practical differential and linear probability bounds of the n-cell GF-NLFSR structure when the non-linear function is a SPN structure.
As applications, we would like to parallelise some of the abovementioned ciphers, where we replace the (generalised) Feistel structures by the parallelisable GF-NLFSR structures, while keeping the internal components like S-boxes and linear diffusion to be the same. This would make encryption speed faster by up to n times. Two candidates which we find promising for parallelising are the Camellia and SMS4 ciphers.
Related works
In order to analyse the resistance of a block cipher against differential and linear cryptanalysis, we would like to establish a lower bound for the number of active S-boxes (S-boxes which contribute to the differential/linear probability) in any differential/linear characteristic path over a fixed number of rounds. Using such bounds, the cipher designer can choose a large enough number of rounds so that there are too many active S-boxes for differential/linear cryptanalysis to be successful. Kanda (2001) has proven that for a Feistel cipher with an SPN round function having branch number B (a measure of dispersion, please refer to Section 2 for the exact definition), the number of active S-boxes in any differential and linear characteristic path over every 4r rounds is at least 2 . r r ⎢ ⎥ + ⎣ ⎦ B Based on this lower bound, the authors of Aoki et al. (2001) designed the block cipher Camellia, which has practical provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis.
Our contribution
In Section 3, we provide a neat and concise proof of the result that for a 2nr-round parallelisable n-cell GF-NLFSR structure with an SPN round function having branch number , B the number of active S-boxes in any differential characteristic path is at least 2 . r r ⎢ ⎥ + ⎣ ⎦ B
The result holds for any n ≥ 2 in general, and we expect the result to be useful in the design and analysis of block cipher structures. For the case of a 2-cell GF-NLFSR structure, we have 2 r r ⎢ ⎥ + ⎣ ⎦ B active S-boxes over every 4r rounds, which is the same as Kanda's (2001) result for a conventional 2-cell Feistel structure. Motivated by this observation, we propose in Section 4 a parallelisable version of Camellia, p-Camellia, where we change the conventional Feistel structure to a 2-cell GF-NLFSR structure but keep all other components such as S-boxes and linear diffusion maps to be the same. We also prove the security of p-Camellia against linear and boomerang attacks, and that the selected number of rounds are conservative enough to provide high security margin against other known attacks such as integral, impossible differential, higher order differential, interpolation and slide attacks.
In addition, we assess the advantages of hardware implementations. For this reason, we briefly introduce design strategies for hardware implementations. We then show that especially for applications with high throughput requirements, a 2-cell GF-NLFSR such as p-Camellia offers significant advantages over a conventional 2-cell Feistel structure such as Camellia. In particular, we show that an implementation of p-Camellia that processes two rounds in parallel has a maximum frequency that is nearly twice as high as it would be for Camellia while having similar area demands and significantly less power demands. We also show that for fully pipelined implementations a conventional 2-cell Feistel structure requires twice as many pipeline stages, and hence twice as many clock cycles delay, to achieve the same frequency as it is the case for a 2-cell GF-NLFSR.
In Section 5, we also apply a 4-cell GF-NLFSR structure to form a parallelisable version of SMS4 called p-SMS4. We change the generalised Feistel structure in both the main cipher and key schedule of SMS4 to a 4-cell GF-NLFSR structure but keep all other components such as S-boxes and linear diffusion maps to be the same. We first prove that p-SMS4 is secure against differential and linear cryptanalysis. showed a powerful related-key differential attack on AES-256 which can recover the secret key with complexity 2 131 using 2 35 related keys. We give a proof through the p-SMS4 key schedule that p-SMS4 is resistant against this attack. We also prove the security of p-Camellia against boomerang attack, and that the selected number of rounds are conservative enough to provide high security margin against other known attacks such as integral, impossible differential, higher order differential, interpolation, slide and XSL attacks.
A 4-cell GF-NLFSR structure offers also implementation advantages for round-based and parallelised hardware architectures. We show that a 4-cell GF-NLFSR structure, implemented in an architecture that processes four rounds in one clock cycle, has a significantly shorter critical path, and hence a higher maximum frequency, than a conventional 4-cell Feistel structure. In parallelised implementations, this advantage increases to a nearly four times higher maximum frequency while having similar area demands and significantly less power demands. In general, the advantage is dependent on the number of branches, hence an n-cell GF-NLFSR has an advantage of a nearly n times higher maximum frequency.
This paper is an extended version of Yap et al. (2010) . We added an explanation of the duality between differential and linear cryptanalysis for the p-Camellia and p-SMS4 structures in Section 3.2, and corrected a slight notational error in the proof of protection against linear cryptanalysis for p-Camellia in Yap et al. (2010) . In addition, a proof for protection against linear cryptanalysis for p-SMS4 was given. We also did a hardware implementation of p-Camellia and p-SMS4 and presented the speed-up over Camellia and SMS4 respectively in this extended paper. Finally, we added test vectors for p-Camellia and p-SMS4.
Definitions and preliminaries
In this section, we will list some definitions and summarise the results of Kanda (2001) . He has proven the upper bounds of the maximum differential and linear characteristic probabilities of Feistel ciphers with bijective SPN round functions. More explicitly, the round function F-function comprises the key addition layer, the S-function and the P-function. Here, we neglect the effect of the round key since by assumption, the round key, which is used within one round, consists of independent and uniformly random bits, and is bitwise XORed with data. The S-function is a non-linear transformation layer with m parallel d-bit bijective S-boxes whereas the P-function is a linear transformation layer. In particular, we have
. Denote the differences and the mask values of x and z by Δx, Δz, and, Γx, Γz, respectively. The differential and linear probabilities of each S-box s i are defined as:
The maximum differential and linear probabilities of S-boxes are defined as:
This means that p s , q s are the upper bounds of the maximum differential and linear probabilities for all S-boxes.
Then the Hamming weight of X is denoted by H w (X) = #{i | x i ≠ 0}.
Definition 4 (Rijmen et al., 1996) : The branch number B of linear transformation θ is defined as follows:
Consider Feistel ciphers with bijective SPN round functions as described previously. As mentioned in Kanda (2001) , for the differential case, B is taken to be the differential branch number, i.e., 0 min ( ( ) ( )),
where ΔX is an input difference into the S-function and ΔY is an output difference of the P-function. On the other hand, for the linear case, B is taken to be the linear branch number, i.e., * 0 min ( ( ( )) ( )),
where ΓY is an output mask value of the P-function and P * is a diffusion function of mask values concerning the P-function. Throughout this paper, B is used to denote differential or linear branch number, depending on the context.
Definition 5:
A differential active S-box is defined as an S-box given a non-zero input difference. Similarly, a linear active S-box is defined as an S-box given a non-zero output mask value. Choy et al. (2009a) . It is an n-cell extension of the outer function FO of the KASUMI block cipher which is a 2-cell structure. Throughout this paper, we consider GF-NLFSR block ciphers with SPN (S-P) round function, as described in Section 1.2. In this paper, we assume that both the S-function and P-function are bijective.
With reference to Figure 1 , let X (i) and Y (i) be the input and output data to the i th round function respectively. Then the GF-NLFSR block cipher can be defined as
for 1, 2, ,
Differential cryptanalysis
We now investigate the minimum number of differential active S-boxes for GF-NLFSR block cipher. From equation (1), it can be shown almost immediately that there must be at least two differential active S-boxes over (n + 1)-round of n-cell GF-NLFSR cipher.
Proposition 1: The minimum number of differential active S-boxes for (n + 1)-round n-cell GF-NLFSR cipher with bijective SPN round function satisfies 
from which it follows that there must exist at least two non-zero terms in equation (2) in order for equation (2) to hold. Therefore,
2. 
Lemma 2 is a straightforward generalisation of Lemma 1.
As stated in Theorem 1, to investigate the upper bound of the maximum differential characteristic probability of the GF-NLFSR cipher, we need to find a lower bound for ( ) , r D the number of differential active S-boxes for r consecutive rounds of the cipher. Then the differential characteristic probability of the r-round GF-NLFSR cipher is at most ( ) . For n-cell GF-NLFSR cipher, the minimum number of differential active S-boxes in any 2n consecutive rounds satisfies (2 ) . n ≥
D B
Proof: Without loss of generality, we assume that the 2n consecutive rounds run from the first round to the 2n th round. For j = 1, ⋅⋅⋅, n, note that at least one of ΔX
, by Lemma 2,
.
Remark 1: From the above proof, we see that with probability ≠ 0. In that case, we are able to achieve at least B number of differential active S-boxes over (n + 1) rounds of n-cell GF-NLFSR cipher.
As a consequence of Lemma 3 and using a similar approach as Kanda (2001), we have the following result.
Theorem 3: The minimum number of differential active S-boxes for 2nr-round n-cell GF-NLFSR cipher with bijective SPN round function satisfies (2 ) . 2
In particular, when n = 2, the minimum number of differential active S-boxes for 4r-round 2-cell GF-NLFSR cipher with bijective SPN round function is at least
Hence, we see that 2-cell GF-NLFSR cipher with bijective SPN round function has similar practical security against differential cryptanalysis as Feistel ciphers with bijective SPN round functions. Moreover, 2-cell GF-NLFSR has an added advantage that it realises parallel computation of round functions, thus providing strong motivation for parallelising ciphers with SPN round functions, as described in Section 4.
Linear cryptanalysis
For the purpose of parallelising Camellia and SMS4, we shall investigate the practical security of 2-cell and 4-cell GF-NLFSR cipher against linear cryptanalysis. Again from Theorem 1, to investigate the upper bound of the maximum linear characteristic probability of the GF-NLFSR cipher, we need to find a lower bound for ( ) , r L the number of linear active S-boxes for r consecutive rounds of the cipher. Then the linear characteristic probability of the r-round cipher is at most ( ) .
We first consider the 2-cell GF-NLFSR cipher, followed by the 4-cell GF-NLFSR cipher.
Duality between differential characteristic and linear approximation
As discussed in Section 3 of Matsui (1995) , when analysing mask values in linear cryptanalysis, we need to consider the duality between differential characteristic and linear approximation, where each XOR is replaced by a joint and each joint is replaced by an XOR. Hence, in the case of 2-cell GF-NLFSR cipher, with reference to Figure 2 , we have ( 2) ( ) ( 1) , for 1,
where the input and output mask values to the i th round F function are denoted by ΓX (i) and ΓY (i) , respectively. Similarly, for 4-cell GF-NLFSR cipher, with reference to Figure 5 , we have
Lemma 4: For 2-cell GF-NLFSR cipher with bijective SPN round function and linear branch number 5, = B the minimum number of linear active S-boxes in any four consecutive rounds satisfies
Proof: Let the input and output mask values to the i th round F function be ΓX (i) and ΓY (i) , respectively. Note that since the F function is bijective, ΓX (i) = 0 if and only if ΓY (i) = 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that the four consecutive rounds run from the first round to the fourth round. Thus, the minimum number of linear active S-boxes over four consecutive rounds is given by
( 4 ) .
As discussed in the previous section, we have, from equation (3), ( 1) ( 1) ( ) ,
for i = 2 and 3. We consider all cases as follows, where
L denotes the number of linear active S-boxes over r rounds for case i:
Hence,
This implies that ΓX (3) = ΓY
. Hence,
≠ 0 and
This implies that
≠ 0 and ΓX (4) = 0
Then we obtain
≠ 0 and ΓX
( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 4 3. 1 From the proof of Lemma 4, over 8 rounds, we only need to check the case for ΓX
≠ 0
and ΓX (4) = 0. (In all remaining cases, there will be at least 7 linear active S-boxes over 8 rounds.) However, ΓX ≠ 0 and ΓX (4) = 0 correspond to Case 1 of Lemma 4 for the four consecutive rounds that begin from the 4th round and end after the 7th round. Hence, there will be at least 3 + 5 = 8 linear active S-boxes. Therefore, (8) 7. ≥ L 2 From (i), over 12 rounds, we only need to consider the case for ΓX
≠ 0 for i = 1, ⋅⋅⋅, 7 and ΓX (8) = 0. Following a similar argument to (i), we are definitely ensured of at least 7 + 5 = 12 linear active S-boxes. Hence, (12) 11. ≥ L 3 The proof is similar to that of (i) and (ii).
We conclude this section with the study of minimum number of active S-boxes for 4-cell GF-NLFSR. (10) 1.
≥ + L B
Proof: With no loss of generality, assume that the 10 rounds run consecutively from the first round to the tenth round. Let ΓX (i) and ΓY (i) be the input and output mask to the i th round function respectively. Recall that due to the duality between differential characteristic and linear approximation, equation (4) holds. Let
We consider all the following cases, where
L denotes the number of linear active S-boxes for r rounds for case j.
Case 1 There is exactly one non-zero input mask in set , M i.e., ΓX ≠ 0. Since for four consecutive rounds, the input masks cannot be zero at the same time, we obtain
Case 2 All input masks in M are non-zero.
By Proposition 1, we obtain 1.
Case 3 There are exactly three non-zero input masks in . M
If there are at least three non-zero input masks in , S then we are done. Also, since the input masks for four consecutive rounds cannot be zero at the same time, at least one input mask in S is non-zero. This implies that we only need to check the following: 1 There is exactly one non-zero input difference in . S Then ΓX (9) = ΓY (j) for j = 5, 6, 7 or 8. Hence
2 There are exactly two non-zero input masks in . S • Suppose ΓX (5) = 0 and ΓX
⊕ ΓY (4) = 0 and it follows that ΓX (6) = ΓY
≠ 0. Hence, we are ensured of at least 2 + B active S-boxes.
• Suppose ΓX (6) = 0 and ΓX
(5) = 0 and it follows that ΓX (7) = ΓY
• Suppose ΓX (6) = ΓX (7) = 0, ΓX
≠ 0 and ΓX (8) ≠ 0. Then it can be deduced easily that ΓX (8) 
≠ 0, and there must be at
≠ 0, then we are done.
Otherwise ΓX (4) = 0 which implies that ΓX
which is a contradiction.
Case 4 There are exactly two non-zero input masks in . M 1 Suppose ΓX (5) = 0. Then ΓX (6) = ΓY (1) .
•
(2) and so we obtain,
2 Suppose ΓX (5) ≠ 0 and ΓX (6) = 0. It follows that ΓX (7) = ΓY (2) .
• If ΓX
≠ 0, then ≠ 0. This implies that ΓX (9) = ΓY (4) , and so (9) 4 (1) 1.
≠ 0, then
3.
≠ 0, then there will be at least 6 linear active S-boxes and we are done. Otherwise ΓX (8) = ΓX (9) = 0 and ΓX (10) = ΓY
≠ 0 and we obtain
2.
Hence considering all cases, we conclude that
Corollary 1: The minimum number of linear active S-boxes for 9-round 4-cell GF-NLFSR cipher with bijective SPN round function satisfies (9) 4. ≥ L Proof: The result follows easily from the proof of Theorem 5.
Application 1: parallelising Camellia
Brief description of Camellia
Camellia was jointly developed by NTT and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation. According to Aoki et al. (2001) , Camellia uses an 18-round Feistel structure for 128-bit key, and a 24-round Feistel structure for 192-bit and 256-bit keys, with additional input/output whitenings and logical functions called the FL-function and FL -1 -function inserted every 6 rounds. Its F-function uses the substitutionpermutation network (SPN) structure, whereby the non-linear layer comprises eight S-boxes in parallel while the linear layer can be represented using only byte-wise exclusive-ORs. Note that the F-function is bijective.
For security against differential and linear cryptanalysis, the branch number of the linear layer should be optimal, i.e., branch number = 5. In addition, the S-boxes adopt functions which are affine equivalent to the inversion function in GF(2 8 ) which achieves the best known of the maximum differential and linear probabilities 2 -6 (Aoki et al., 2001 ). The key schedule of Camellia is slightly different for the 128-bit key version and the 192-bit/256-bit key version. Despite the slight differences, the key schedule is relatively simple and consists of two main steps. One (or two) 128-bit subkey materials are first derived from the secret key via some Feistel network. The round keys are then generated by rotating the secret key itself and the derived subkeys by various amounts.
For more details of the structure of Camellia, readers are referred to Aoki et al. (2000) .
Parallelising Camellia: p-Camellia
In this section, we propose another version of the existing Camellia block cipher, which we call p-Camellia ('parallelisable' Camellia). As described previously, Camellia uses a Feistel network structure. For the encryption procedure of p-Camellia, we shall replace the Feistel network with the 2-cell GF-NLFSR block cipher structure instead, as depicted in Figure 6 of Appendix. Other components such as number of rounds, S-function, P-function and the key schedule for the different key versions, etc. remain unchanged. In addition, similar to Camellia, there are input/output whitenings which are represented by the XOR symbols at the beginning/end of p-Camellia cipher in Figure 6 .
Differential and linear cryptanalysis of p-Camellia
Following the same approach in Aoki et al. (2000) , denote the maximum differential and linear characteristic probabilities of p-Camellia reduced to 16-round by p and q respectively. Recall that since both p-Camellia and Camellia use the same F-function, in the case of p-Camellia, the maximum differential and linear probability of the S-boxes are 2 -6 . From Aoki et al. (2000) , the differential branch numbers is equal to 5. By considering the P*-function of Camellia as in Kanda (2001) , the linear branch number is verified to be 5.
Over 16 . This implies that an attacker needs to collect at least 2 90 chosen/known plaintexts to mount an attack, which is not feasible in practice. This implies that there is no effective differential or linear characteristic for p-Camellia reduced to more than 15 rounds. In other words, p-Camellia offers sufficient security against differential and linear attack.
Other attacks on p-Camellia
In this section, we briefly examine the protection of p-Camellia against various known attacks. Since p-Camellia uses the same components as Camellia, we expect that p-Camellia offers similar level of protection against most of the attacks, as compared to Camellia.
Boomerang attack
To perform a boomerang attack, the cipher is split into two shorter ciphers E 0 and E 1 such that the differential probability of each part is known to be large. Suppose an adversary split 16 rounds into E 0 and E 1 with r and 16 -r rounds, respectively. By Theorem 3, the characteristic differential probability of each sub-ciphers would be bounded by p 0 ≤ (2-30 ) ⎣r/4⎦ and p 1 ≤ (2 -30 )
. (Note that we ignore the last term in the upper bound of Theorem 3 for ease of calculation.) It can be easily verified that ⎣r / 4⎦ + ⎣(16 -r) / 4⎦ ≥ 3 for r = 1, …, 15. Consequently, 
Impossible differential attack
Impossible differential attack is a chosen plaintext attack and is an extension of differential cryptanalysis. The main idea of this attack is to construct an impossible differential characteristic which is then used to filter wrong key guesses. Employing similar techniques as Wei et al. (2010) , we can prove the following result. (Note that here we only consider 3 ≥ B since linear transformation layers with 2 = B are unlikely to be used as they do not aid in the protection of the cipher against differential attack.)
Proof: Suppose for a contradiction that (e 1 , 0) → 5 (β,β) is possible. In the direction of encryption, after 3 rounds, we have (e 1 , 0) → (PS(e 1 ), PS(e 1 ) ⊕ PSPS(e 1 )). On the other hand, decrypting two rounds, we obtain (S -1 Since for p-Camellia, 5, = B by Proposition 2, there is at least a 5-round impossible differential in p-Camellia. We have not found impossible differentials with more than 5 rounds. As explained in Aoki et al. (2001) , we expect that the presence of the FL-and FL -1 functions will greatly increase the difficulty of performing impossible differential attack on p-Camellia since the functions change the differential paths depending on key values.
Integral attack
In an integral attack, the attacker studies the propagation of multisets of chosen plaintexts of which part is held constant, and another part varies through all possibilities (also said to be active) through the cipher. There is a 4-round integral distinguisher of 2-cell GF-NLFSR (Choy et al., 2009a) , namely (A, C) → (S 0 , S 1 ), where C is constant, A is active and S 0 ⊕ S 1 is active. We have not found integral distinguishers with more than 4 rounds. An adversary can extend an integral attack distingusher by at most three rounds. That means he would need to extend the integral attack distinguisher from 4 to 18 -3 = 15 rounds which seems unlikely.
Slide attack
The slide attack works on ciphers with cyclical structures over a few rounds. According to Aoki et al. (2001) , the FL-and FL -1 -functions are inserted between every 6 rounds to provide non-regularity across rounds. In addition, different subkeys are used for every round, making slide attack unlikely.
We now proceed to examine the protection of p-Camellia against higher order differential attack and interpolation attack. We will adopt a similar approach as Aoki et al. (2001) , which is somewhat heuristic but adequate for us to have a comprehensive and insightful discussion.
Higher order differential attack
Higher order differential attack was introduced by Knudsen (1995) . This attack works especially well on block ciphers with components of low algebraic degree such as the KN-cipher (Jakobsen and Knudsen, 1997) , whereby the ciphers can be represented as Boolean polynomials of low degree in terms of the plaintext. The attack requires O(2 t+1 ) chosen plaintext when the cipher has degree t. p-Camellia uses exactly the same S-boxes as Camellia and it was confirmed in Aoki et al. (2001) that the degree of the Boolean polynomial of every output bit of the S-boxes is 7 by finding Boolean polynomial for every outpit bit of the S-boxes. Hence, similar to Camellia, the degree of an intermediate bit in the encryption process should increase as the data passes through many S-boxes. Indeed, let (α i , β i ) be the input to the (i + 1) th round of p-Camellia. Suppose deg(α 0 ) = deg(β 0 ) = 1. After the first round, deg(α 1 ) = deg(β 0 ) = 1 while deg(α 1 ) = deg(F(α 0 ) ⊕ β 0 ) = 7. Continuing this process, we see that the degrees of α i and β i for i = 0, 1, 2, ⋅⋅⋅, increases as follows: (1, 1), (1, 7), (7, 7), (7, 49), (49, 49), (49, 127), (127, 127), ⋅⋅⋅.
That is, the degrees increase exponentially as the number of rounds increase and reach the maximum degree of 127 after the 6th round, implying that it is highly unlikely that higher order differential attack will work.
Interpolation attack
The interpolation attack (Jakobsen and Knudsen, 2001 ) works on block ciphers that can be expressed as an equation in GF(2 d ) with few monomials. p-Camellia uses the same components as Camellia and it was shown in Aoki et al. (2001) that as the data passes through many S-boxes and the P-function, the cipher became a complex function which is a sum of many multivariate monomials over GF( 2 8 ). Hence, we also expect p-Camellia to be secure against interpolation attack.
Implementation advantages
Before we discuss the implementation advantages of p-Camellia we briefly introduce hardware implementation strategies for block ciphers that consist of a round-function that is iterated several times. While software implementations have to process single operations in a serial manner, hardware implementations offer more flexibility for parallelisation. Generally speaking, there exist three major architecture strategies for the implementation of block ciphers: serialised, round-based, and parallelised. In a serialised architecture, only a fraction of a single round is processed in one clock cycle. These lightweight implementations allow reduction in area and power consumption at the cost of a rather long processing time. If a complete round is performed in one clock cycle, we have a round-based architecture. This implementation strategy usually offers the best time-area product and throughput per area ratio. A parallelised architecture processes more than one round per clock cycle, leading to a rather long critical path. A longer critical path leads to a lower maximum frequency but also requires the gates to drive a higher load (fanout), which results in larger gates with a higher power consumption. By inserting intermediate registers (a technique called pipelining), it is possible to split the critical path into fractions, thus increasing the maximum frequency. Once the pipeline is filled, a complete encryption can be performed in one clock cycle with such an architecture. Consequently, this implementation strategy yields the highest throughput at the cost of high area demands. Furthermore, since the pipeline has to be filled, each pipelining stage introduces a delay of one clock cycle. From a lightweight perspective, i.e., if we consider serialised architectures, it is no wonder that area, power and timing demands stay the same for Camellia and p-Camellia, since no operation was introduced or removed. Also, a round-based p-Camellia implementation is as efficient as a round-based Camellia implementation. However, if we consider applications that require high throughput, p-Camellia has significant advantages. If we consider an architecture that implements two rounds in one clock cycle (see Figure 3 ), Camellia's critical path involves two F-functions and two 2-input XOR gates, compared to only one F-function and one 3-input XOR gate for p-Camellia. Since Camellia inserts every six rounds the FL and FL -1 functions, it is advantageous to parallelise this fraction of Camellia/p-Camellia. In this case, the critical path of Camellia consists of six F-functions, six 2-input XOR gates and the delay of FL/FL -1 while p-Camellia's critical path only consists of three F-functions, three 3-input XOR gates, and the delay of FL/FL -1 . Given the fact that the F-function consists of a 2-input XOR gate (key addition), several combinatorial gates (S-box) and an extensive XOR network (P-function), the delay difference between a 2-input and a 3-input XOR gate is negligible. Hence, p-Camellia can achieve a maximum frequency that is nearly twice as high as it would be for Camellia while having similar or lower area and power demands. In case pipelining is applied, Camellia requires twice as much pipelining stages as p-Camellia to achieve the same maximum frequency, resulting in a delay that is twice as high.
To substantiate our claims, we have implemented the round function of Camellia and p-Camellia each with a 128-bit key in VHDL. We obtained area, timing and power figures for a 180 nm ASIC technology from UMC using Synopsys Design Vision for synthesis. Table 1 depicts a comparison of the hardware implementation results of the round function of Camellia and p-Camellia. This is a typical setup in a co-processor or instruction set extension scenario. As expected, the area requirements of 4877 GE for one instance of the round function are the same for Camellia and p-Camellia and double to 9,754 GE for two instances. Also the maximum frequency of 229.4 MHz is the same for Camellia and p-Camellia in the one round implementation. However, as depicted in Figure 3 the critical path for two consecutive instances of the round function of Camellia is nearly twice as long as for p-Camellia. Consequently, the maximum frequency achievable for Camellia drops to 51.4% while it only slightly decreases to 96.5% for p-Camellia. p-Camellia cannot achieve exactly twice the maximum frequency, because it XORs three summands, while Camellia only XORs two summands. The maximum throughput of a 1 round implementation is the same for Camellia and p-Camellia and achieves 29.4 Gbps (Giga bits per second). A two round Camellia implementation slightly increases the maximum throughput by a mere 2.7% to 30.2 Gbps, while p-Camellia boosts the maximum throughput to 56.6 Gbps -an increment of 92.9% compared to the 1 round Camellia implementation and still 87.8% higher than the 2 round Camellia implementation. For all architectures, we simulated the power consumption at a frequency of 100 MHz and a supply voltage of 1.8 Volt. 1 round of Camellia and p-Camellia require both 2.65 mW. While the power consumption for the 2 rounds implementation of Camellia increases more than 3 times (+216%) to 8.38 mW, it less than doubles for the 2 rounds implementation of p-Camellia (+96%) to 5.2 mW compared to the 1 round implementations. These figures highlight the advantages of p-Camellia over Camellia from a power perspective.
Application 2: parallelising SMS4
Brief description of SMS4
According to Diffe and Ledin (2008) , SMS4 takes in a 128-bit key and uses a 32-round generalised Feistel structure to transform the plaintext to the ciphertext. Each round of the generalised Feistel transformation transforms four 32-bit words X i , i = 0, 1, 2, 3, as follows:
where r k denotes the round key. In each round, the non-linear function T does the following operations in sequence: 32-bit subkey addition, S-box substitution (layer of four 8-bit S-boxes) and lastly, a 32-bit linear transformation L.
It is well-known that the S-boxes adopt functions affine equivalent to the inversion function in GF( 2 8 ) (Ji and Hu, 2007; Choy et al., 2009c) , which achieves the best known maximum differential and linear probabilities of 2 -6 . Furthermore, it can be verified that the branch number of the linear transformation L is 5.
This gives optimal spreading effect which increases the number of active S-boxes for protection against differential and linear cryptanalysis.
The key schedule of SMS4 XORs the secret key MK with a constant FK and passes it through a nearly-identical 32-round structure as the main SMS4 cipher. The only difference is that the 32-bit linear transformation L is replaced by a simpler linear transformation L′, which can be verified to have branch number 4.
The 32-bit non-linear output of the i th round of the key schedule is taken to be the i th round subkey of the main cipher. For more details, please refer to Diffe and Ledin (2008) .
Parallelising SMS4: p-SMS4
In this section, we propose another version of the existing SMS4 block cipher, which we call p-SMS4 ('parallelisable' SMS4). As described previously, SMS4 uses a generalised Feistel network structure described by equation (6). For the encryption procedure of p-SMS4, we shall replace the generalised Feistel network with the 4-cell GF-NLFSR block cipher structure described by: 1  2  3   1  2  3  1  2  3  0 , , , , , , , .
Other components such as number of rounds and the T-function, which consists of four S-boxes and a L-function, remain the same as SMS4. One round of p-SMS4 corresponds to a 4-cell version of the structure in Figure 1, where the non-linear function F(⋅) is the T-function used in SMS4.
The key schedule of p-SMS4 XORs the secret key MK with a constant FK and passes it through an identical 32-round structure as the main cipher of p-SMS4 described by equation (7). The constant FK, S-box and the linear transformation L′ of the key schedule remain the same as SMS4. We need the key schedule to have the same structure as the main cipher so that it is also parallelisable in hardware, and thus can be made 'on-the-fly'.
Differential and linear cryptanalysis of p-SMS4
Su et al. proved bounds for the differential characteristic probability of the SMS4 cipher in Su et al. (2010) . One of the results they proved was that in every 7 rounds of the SMS4 cipher, there are at least 5 active S-boxes. However, there are currently no known bounds on the linear characteristic probability of SMS4 to the best of our knowledge.
Similarly for the p-SMS4 cipher, we can easily compute the differential characteristic bound by Theorem 3. Denote the maximum differential probability of p-SMS4 reduced to 29-round by p (we assume a minus-3 round attack where the attacker guesses three subkeys with complexity 296).
Recall that both p-SMS4 and SMS4 use the same T-function. In the case of p-SMS4, the maximum differential probability of the S-boxes is 2 -6 and 5. chosen plaintext-ciphertext pairs to launch an attack. This is not feasible in practice. Moreover by Remark 1, for random input differences, we have at least 5 active S-boxes every 5 rounds with probability 1 -2 -32 . Only 2 -32 of the time do we need 8 rounds to ensure at least 5 active S-boxes. Thus, we expect the bound for the differential characteristic probability to be even lower. In summary, we have shown that p-SMS4 offers sufficient security against differential cryptanalysis.
Denote the maximum linear probability of p-SMS4 reduced to 28-round by q. Recall that the maximum linear probability of the S-boxes is 2 -6 and the linear branch number is 5. By Theorem 5 and Corollary 1, we deduce that there must be at least 16 linear active S-boxes. Hence, q ≤ (2 -6 ) 16 = 2 -96 . This implies that an attacker needs to collect at least 2 96 chosen/known plaintexts to mount a linear attack, which is not feasible in practice.
This implies that there is no effective differential or linear characteristic for p-SMS4 reduced to more than 29 rounds. In other words, p-SMS4 offers sufficient security against differential and linear attack.
Related-key differential attack on p-SMS4
Related-key differential attacks have been shown to have the devastating effect of recovering the secret key of AES-256 with a complexity of 2 131 using 2 35 related keys in . In related-key differential attack, there are non-zero differential inputs into both the cipher and the key schedule. The adversary tries to find a differential characteristic path in the key schedule with probability pk and a differential characteristic path in the main cipher with probability p c|k that holds, on the condition that the key schedule differential path is true. The attacker can then launch the attack with complexity O(1 / (p k × p c|k )) where he can tweak the secret key 1 / p k times to get that many related keys. In AES-256, we have p k = 2−35 and p c|k = 2 -93 . Because the p-SMS4 key schedule uses a 4-cell GF-NLFSR structure, we can try to bound the probability p k of a differential characteristic path in the key schedule by Theorem 3. However, Theorem 3 cannot be directly applied to the main cipher to derive the differential characteristic probability p c|k because there are subkey differential inputs into every round.
We use the fact that the key schedule uses the inversion S-box with differential probability 2 -6 and that the linear transform L′ has branch number 4. d ′ = L By Theorem 3 with n = 4 and r = 4, every 24 rounds of the key schedule has 4 × 3 + ⎣3/2⎦ = 13 active S-boxes. With a computation similar to Section 5.3, we have another 2 active S-boxes over the next 5 rounds giving: ) and uses at least 2 90 related keys, which is not feasible in practice. Again, by a similar explanation as in Section 5.3 based on Remark 1, most of the time we have 5 active S-boxes per 5 rounds and we expect p k to be lower and the attack complexity to be higher.
In , a related-key boomerang attack on AES-256 with a complexity of 2 119 using 4 related keys is presented but it assumes a more powerful adverserial model. In a similar way, we can show through the p-SMS4 key schedule differential structure that related-key boomerang attack is infeasible.
Other attacks on p-SMS4
Boomerang attack
Suppose an adversary performs a minus-3 round attack on 29 rounds of p-SMS4. He would need to split 29 rounds into two sub-ciphers E 0 , E 1 with r and 29 -r rounds respectively, where r = 1, ⋅⋅⋅, 28. By Proposition 1 and p p × for each combination of n 8 and n 5 are also given in Table 2 . From Table 2 , we see that
Hence, p-SMS4 is secure against boomerang attack. 
Impossible differential attack
According to Choy et al. (2009a) , Li et al. (2009) and Wu et al. (2009) , there is at least one 18-round impossible differential distinguisher in the 4-cell GF-NLFSR, which results in a 25-round impossible differential attack with complexity 2 123 and uses 2 115 chosen plaintext encryptions. An identical attack is applicable to 25-round p-SMS4 with the same complexity. However, that attack is unlikely to work on the full p-SMS4 cipher, which has 32 rounds.
Integral attack
According to Choy et al. (2009a) and Li et al. (2009) , there is at least one 16-round integral attack distinguisher in the 4-cell GF-NLFSR starting with one active 32-bit word. A naive key guessing attack can extend this distinguisher by at most 3 rounds at the end (guessing more rounds of keys may make the complexity too close to 2 128 ). An adversary may extend the attack by 4 rounds in front, starting with three active words and using the method of Hwang et al. (2002) . Using these means, we expect a 4 + 16 + 3 = 23 round attack on p-SMS4 and the full 32 rounds will be secure against integral attack.
Slide attack
The slide attack works on ciphers with cyclical structures over a few rounds. However, the subkeys used in every round are non-linearly derived from the previous subkey. Thus, the subkeys are all distinct and there is no simple linear relation between them, making slide attack unlikely.
XSL attack
In Ji and Hu (2007) showed that the eprint XSL attack on SMS4 embedded in GF( 2 8 ) can be applied with complexity 277. A similar analysis can be applied on p-SMS4 to show that the complexity of the eprint XSL attack on p-SMS4 embedded in GF( 2 8 ) is also 277. However, it was shown by Choy et al. (2009c) that Ji and Hu's analysis might be too optimistic and the actual complexity of the compact XSL attack on embedded SMS4 is at least 2 216.58 . We can use an analysis identical to the ones used in Choy et al. (2009c) to show that the complexity of the compact XSL attack on p-SMS4 is also at least 2 216.58 . Using a similar approach as Aoki et al. (2001) , we discuss the protection of p-SMS4 against higher order differential attack and interpolation attack in the remaining of this section.
Higher order differential attack
As mentioned previously, higher order differential attack is generally applicable to ciphers that can be represented as Boolean polynomials of low degree in terms of the plaintext. The attack requires O(2 t+1 ) chosen plaintext when the cipher has degree t.
p-SMS4 uses exactly the same S-boxes as SMS4 where the degree of the Boolean polynomial of every output bit of the S-boxes is 7. Making the assumption that when we compose two randomly chosen S-boxes F, G of degree t 1 , t 2 , F G should have degree t 1 t 2 . We expect the degree of an intermediate bit in the encryption process to increase exponentially as the data passes through many S-boxes.
Indeed, by the 4th round, every output bit will have degree 7. By the 8th round, every output bit will have degree 7 2 = 49. By the 12th round, every output bit will have degree min(7 3 , 127) = 127 in terms of the plaintext bits. Therefore, p-SMS4 is secure against higher order differential attack.
Interpolation attack
The interpolation attack works on block ciphers that can be expressed as an equation in GF(2 d ) with few monomials. p-SMS4 uses the same components as SMS4 and as the data passes through many S-boxes and L-functions, the cipher will became a complex function which is a sum of exponentially many multivariate monomials over GF( 2 8 ). Hence, we expect p-SMS4 to be secure against interpolation attack.
Implementation advantages
Similar to p-Camellia, we will assess the implementation advantages of p-SMS4 over SMS4 with respect to serialised, round-based and parallelised architectures. In case of SMS4, the XOR sum of three branches forms the input to the F-function and its output is XORed to the last branch while p-SMS4 uses one branch as the input for the F-function and XORs its output to the remaining three branches. This difference allows more flexible implementations of p-SMS4 compared to SMS4, because the XOR sum of four signals can be achieved by either using three 2-input XOR gates or combining a 3-input XOR gate with a 2-input XOR gate. The first option is faster (0.33 ns vs. 0.45 ns) while the second option requires less area (256 GE vs. 235 GE), which is an advantage for lightweight implementations. Beside this flexibility, p-SMS4 has similar characteristics as SMS4 for a serialised implementation. The critical path of a round-based p-SMS4 implementation is shorter than that of SMS4, since it consists of the F-function and a 2-input XOR gate compared to a 3-input XOR gate, the F-function and a 2-input XOR gate for SMS4. 
For parallelised implementations p-SMS4 offers even greater advantages. If we consider an implementation that processes four rounds in one clock cycle (see Figure 4) , the critical path of p-SMS consists only of the F-function and two 2-input XOR gates while SMS4's critical path consists of four F-functions, four 2-input XOR gates and four 3-input XOR gates. Hence, the maximum frequency and thus the maximum throughput that can be achieved with p-SMS4 using such an architecture is around four times higher while the area and power consumption are similar or lower compared to a corresponding SMS4 implementation. A similar frequency can be achieved for SMS4 by inserting three pipelining stages, which significantly increases the area and power consumption and introduces a delay of three clock cycles.
To substantiate our claims, we have implemented the round function of SMS4 and p-SMS4 in VHDL. We obtained area, timing and power figures for a 180 nm ASIC technology from UMC using Synopsys design vision for synthesis. Table 3 depicts a comparison of the hardware implementation results of the round function of SMS4 and p-SMS4. This is a typical setup in a co-processor or instruction set extension scenario. As expected, the area requirements of 2,924 GE for one instance of the round function are the same for SMS3 and p-SMS4 and nearly quadruple to 11,546 GE and 11,574 GE for four instances. The 1 round implementation of p-SMS4 achieves a slightly higher maximum frequency of 290.7 MHz compared to SMS4 with 288.2 MHz. However, as depicted in Figure 4 the critical path for four consecutive instances of the round function of SMS4 is nearly four times as long as for p-SMS4. Consequently, the maximum frequency achievable for SMS4 drops to 25.4% while it only slightly decreases to 92.8% for p-SMS4. The maximum throughput of a 1 round implementation is the about same for SMS4 and p-SMS4 and achieves 36.9 Gbps and 37.2 Gbps, respectively. A four round SMS4 implementation slightly increases the maximum throughput by a mere 1.4% to 37.4 Gbps, while p-SMS4 boosts the maximum throughput to 136.9 Gbpsan increment of 271.1% compared to the 1 round SMS4 implementation and still 266% higher than the 4 round SMS4 implementation. For all architectures, we simulated the power consumption at a frequency of 100 MHz and a supply voltage of 1.8 Volt. 1 round of SMS4 requires 1.81 mW and a similar p-SMS4 implementation requires 1.39 mW. While the power consumption for the 4 rounds implementation of SMS4 increases more than 6 times (+528%) to 11.38 mW, it less than quadruples for the 4 rounds implementation of p-SMS4 (+222%) to 5.85 mW compared to the 1 round implementations. These figures highlight the advantages of p-SMS4 over SMS4 from a power perspective. From these estimates it becomes clear that the implementation advantages of our newly proposed parallelisable Feistel-structure becomes even larger with a growing number of branches. In fact, an n-cell GF-NLFSR can be implemented using n rounds in parallel while having nearly the same critical path as for a single round implementation. This translates to an about n times higher maximum frequency while the area and power consumption are similar then for a conventional Feistel structure.
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed the use of n-cell GF-NLFSR structure to parallelise (generalised) Feistel structures. We used two examples, p-Camellia and p-SMS4, and showed that they offer sufficient security against various known existing attacks. At the same time, as compared to their conventional Feistel structure counterparts Camellia and SMS4, their hardware implementations achieve a maximum frequency that is about n times higher, where n is the number of Feistel branches, while having similar area demands and significantly less power demands. These estimates indicate that of n-cell GF-NLFSRs are particularly well suited for applications that require a high throughput. 
Appendix A
A.1 Figures
A.2 Test vectors
Here, we provide test vectors for p-Camellia with 128, 192, and 256 bit keys (Tables 4 to 6 ) and for p-SMS4 with a 128 bit key (Table 7) . We stick to the test vector format of the corresponding original ciphers, Camellia and SMS4. 
